Abstract-Graphs are powerful tools suitable for a large variety of applications including chemical databases and the Semantic Web, among others. A fundamental query of graph databases is the subgraph query: given a query graph q, it retrieves the data graphs from a database that contain q. Due to the cost of managing massive data coupled with the computational hardness of subgraph query processing, outsourcing the processing to a third-party service provider is an appealing alternative. However, security properties such as data integrity and the response time are critical Quality of Service (QoS) issues in query services. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, authenticated subgraph query services have not been addressed before. To support the service, we propose Merkle IFTree ðMIFTreeÞ where Merkle hash trees are applied into our Intersection-aware Feature-subgraph Tree ðIFTreeÞ. IFTree aims to minimize I/O in a well-received subgraph query paradigm called the filtering-and-verification framework. The structures that need to be introduced to verification objects (VOs) and the authentication time are both minimized. Subsequently, the overall response time is minimized. For optimizations, we propose an enhanced authentication method on MIFTree. Our detailed experiments on both real and synthetic datasets demonstrate that MIFTree is clearly more efficient than a baseline method.
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INTRODUCTION
T HERE have been a wide range of emerging applications of graph databases, including bio-informatics, chemiinformatics, and web topology [6] , [23] , [24] , whose data are modeled as graphs. To retrieve graphs from large graph databases, many structural queries have been proposed. Among others, subgraph isomorphism query (or simply subgraph query) (e.g., [3] , [9] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [30] , [32] , [36] , [37] ) has been a fundamental and popular query. Specifically, given a query graph q and a graph database G, retrieve all graphs in G that contain q as a subgraph.
1 For example, in biology, there are more than 1, 500 online molecular biology databases [6] . In chemistry, PubChem [23] provides public access to numerous chemical compounds. Users can query compounds containing their structures via its web interface.
Due to the cost of hosting the explosive volume of data and performing large-scale computations, the owners of graph databases may not always have the necessary IT infra-structure and expertise to provide the best usage of their data. An appealing solution to address this issue of managing voluminous data is to outsource the owners' data to a third-party service provider (e.g., Amazon EC2 and Google Cloud Service). Then, the service provider provides query services on the data owners' behalf. For instance, according to [23] , PubChem has managed 19 million unique compound structures. PubChem allows laboratories to submit their data [22] ; and PubChem manages the data on the laboratories' behalf. In addition to PubChem, in drug engineering, many commercial service providers (e.g., [1] , [2] , [11] ) support outsourcing of pharma databases owned by laboratories. Laboratories then focus on the curation of their data.
Security properties such as data integrity are listed as Quality of Service (QoS) issues [20] in (query) services. A reason is that the service provider may be untrusted and/or compromised to attacks and clients may receive tampered results. For instance, Fig. 1 shows an example of a graph database G and a query graph q. Suppose the service provider stores G and its index and the client retrieves graphs that contain q. Suppose g 4 is the answer graph. However, the service provider might return incorrect results, e.g., g 1 , simply abort the computation or return partial answers as some queries may in fact take long to evaluate. In this scenario, the owner/client may never be sure whether the data was outsourced correctly. In practice, the query can be some sensitive chemical compound such as benzopyrene, a carcinogenic substance recently found in some ramen. A compromised service provider might collaborate with some ramen companies and conveniently skip their ingredients that contain benzopyrene. Another important attribute of QoS is the response time of a service. In this paper, it consists of the times for query processing, data transmission and authentication of query results. These two attributes of QoS significantly influence the practicality of outsourcing graph databases. Hence, there is a need for efficient query 1. There are two streams of research work on subgraph queries [8] . One stream handles a very large graph. The other stream concerns a large number of small graphs, which is the focus of this study.
authentication framework to support the subgraph query services.
Majority of existing querying or indexing algorithms for subgraph queries adopt a filtering-and-verification framework [3] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] consisting of two key steps. 1) In the filtering phase, the query is decomposed into a set of individual features and an index is searched with those features. The search of each individual feature yields a set of graphs (represented by graph IDs) containing this searched feature. The sets of graphs are intersected to form a candidate set (a superset of answers). 2) In the verification phase, each graph in the candidate set is checked by an exact subgraph isomorphic algorithm to compute the final result set. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing subgraph querying works addresses authentication of such a framework. In this paper, we take the first step towards this goal.
In a typical query authentication system [7] , a data owner publishes his database and signature; A service provider processes queries from a client and transmits to the client both the answer and a verification object ðVOÞ which stores the processing traces such as index traversals and; By using the answer and VO, the client synthesizes the digest of the database/index and compares it with the data owner's signature to verify the authenticity of the answer.
As the filtering-and-verification framework is not specially designed for authentication, we note at least three problems that may cause large VO to be transmitted to clients and inefficient authentication at clients. Firstly, query features must be authenticated to ensure the correct graph IDs are fetched and intersected. The more the query features, the larger the VO. Unfortunately, none of the previous work minimizes the number of query features used in query processing. Secondly, all graph IDs involved in the intersections must be represented in the VO so that the client can efficiently and correctly verify the intersections. Thirdly, the answer graphs do not generally form a range. In the worst case, each answer graph is authenticated separately. This makes direct applications of classical techniques (e.g., MHT [21] or signature chaining [25] ) inefficient. Observe that both the query features and their graph IDs (described in the first two problems) dominate the I/O of the filtering phase and therefore, the problem of minimizing VOs is directly related to minimizing I/O of the filtering-and-verification framework.
In this paper, we propose a novel authenticationfriendly index called Intersection-aware Feature-subgraph Tree ðIFTreeÞ to address the aforementioned technical challenges. We then apply MHTs to IFTree called Merkle IFTree for efficient authentication. Specifically, for the first problem, in order to minimize the number of features used in the filtering phase, we propose a novel higher-order feature called Partially Overlapping Features ðPOFÞ which are themselves features composed by individual features. We propose to decompose a query into an optimal POF set such that fewest POFs (i.e., fewest intersections) are used in querying time and meanwhile, more individual features are implicitly used in the filtering phase. As a result, fewer graph IDs are fetched while the candidate set is minimized. As we shall see later, the number of fetched graph IDs in query processing on IFTree is 5 times smaller than that of a baseline. Moreover, the size of candidate set using IFTree is around 25 percent smaller than that of a baseline. Consequently, the VO size and authentication time are reduced by a factor of 3.6 and 3.3, respectively. For the second problem, we propose a compact matrix representation of intersection of graph IDs on MIFTree to form an enhanced authentication. Our experiments show that the compact representation improves the VO size and the authentication time by a factor around 2.5 and 3.4 (respectively). For the last problem, we determine the optimal ordering of graphs that are ''intersect-able''. Our empirical study demonstrates that graphs needed to be authenticated form the fewest number of ranges and the corresponding VO size is reduced by around 40 percent. We observe that the overall improvement of the response time over the baseline is often more than an order of magnitude. We show that the energy saving on smartphone by using our proposed techniques is about 27 percent over the baseline.
In summary, the contributions are listed as follows.
. We propose a novel higher-order feature, called partially overlapping feature for indexing graphs. We leverage these features to propose a novel index, namely Intersection-aware Feature-subgraph Tree ðIFTreeÞ. For basic authentication, we apply MHTs to various structures of IFTree called MIFTree. . We propose a novel matrix representation of intersection of graph IDs for enhanced authentication. . We cluster the graphs that are ''intersect-able'' by adopting approximation algorithms. . We conduct extensive experiments with real and synthetic datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our proposed methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related works. We present the preliminaries and overview in Section 3. We present partially overlapping feature in Section 4. We propose IFTree and its query processing in Section 5. We propose Merkle IFTree and a basic authentication in Section 6. Section 7 proposes an enhanced authentication and the optimal ordering of graphs. Section 8 presents a detailed experiment. Section 9 concludes this paper. We present all the detailed proofs in Appendix A which is available in the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TSC.2013.42.
RELATED WORK
Although there are several efforts in the literature on query authentication for relational and range queries [17] , [25] , stream queries [27] , [34] , spatial queries [33] , XML queries [5] , text search [26] , and multi-dimensional queries [4] , very few work focus on authentication of graph query processing. Yiu et al. [35] propose authentication of shortest path queries on road networks. However, the ordering of objects in road networks can be determined offline, e.g., by network-based distance. Such ordering is absent in graph databases in general and it is not clear how to adopt this work to subgraph queries. Kundu et al. [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , propose a series of methods for a closely related problem. They verify the authenticity of a given portion of data (subtree/subgraph that users' have the right to access to) without any leakage of extraneous information of the data (tree/graph/forest). They optimize the signature needed and recently propose a scheme that uses one signature [13] , [14] . However, in our problem setting, the portion of the data retrieved is the answer of a client's query, which is yet to be processed by an untrusted service provider. Therefore, the client is required to authenticate both the soundness and completeness (see Section 3.3) of the portion of retrieved data. Search DAGs (Directed Acyclic Graph) [19] is a generalized model for authenticating a large class of data structures, e.g., binary trees, multi-dimensional range trees and tries. However, subgraph query processing can hardly be efficiently cast into a DAG search.
A large number of indexing techniques have been proposed for evaluating subgraph queries. These efforts can be roughly classified into two approaches, namely feature-based approaches (e.g., [3] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] ) and non-feature-based approaches (e.g., [9] , [37] ). Examples of features are frequent subgraphs, using tools such as gSpan [31] and CAM code [10] . Recently, iGraph [8] implemented these techniques on a common platform and reported that former approaches outperform latter approaches in most cases. Hence, we adopt the feature-based approach in our study.
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
In this section, we first discuss the background to subgraph query processing and query authentication. We then formulate the problem studied. A baseline approach and an overview of our solution are discussed.
Background for Subgraph Query
This paper assumes undirected labeled connected graphs. For simplicity, we may use the term graphs to refer to them. A graph is denoted as g ¼ ðV; E; S; lÞ, where V ðgÞ, EðgÞ, S and l are the set of vertices, the set of edges, the set of labels of vertices and edges and the function that maps a vertex or edge to a label, respectively. We use jgj to denote the size of graph g, where jgj ¼ jEðgÞj. Following the literature of a popular stream of graph databases [3] , [9] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] , [37] , we consider graphs of modest sizes. Subgraph query can be formally defined in Def. 3.1. We say a graph g is a subgraph of another graph g 0 if there exists a subgraph isomorphism from g to g 0 , denoted as g g 0 or subIsoðg; g 0 Þ ¼ true. It is known that deciding whether g is the subgraph of g 0 is NP-hard. Subgraph query processing can be described as follows. Definition 3.2. Given a graph database G ¼ fg 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g n g and a query graph q, we want to determine the query answers R q ¼ fg i jsubIsoðq; g i Þ; g i 2 Gg.
Subgraph Query Paradigms
Two query paradigms for subgraph queries have been proposed: feature-based (e.g., [3] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] ) and non-feature-based (e.g., [9] , [37] ) indexes. From Section 2 above, iGraph [8] concludes that the former often outperforms the latter. This work contributes to the feature-based approaches.
Feature-based approaches index graphs by their individual features. The term individual feature is used to refer to those proposed previously, as the one we put forward comprise individual features that form ''higher-order '' features. An index of this approach uses these features as the search keys for the graphs that contain them.
A well-received query paradigm for feature-based approaches is the filtering-and-verification framework [3] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] . Early work on subgraph query processing such as Shasha et al. [29] proposes filtering graphs via paths and then verifying the remaining graphs through subIso. Some later works [3] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] proposed innovative solutions that follow such a framework. To illustrate the filtering-and-verification framework, we present a seminal index called gIndex [32] which is shown efficient in many cases [8] . gIndex proposes discriminative frequent features as individual features, denoted as F , for indexing. A discriminative frequent feature f, f 2 F , is . a subgraph whose size is smaller than or equal to maxL, where maxL is a user-defined maximum feature size; . a frequent feature that jD f j ! SISFðjfjÞ, where D f ¼ ffjf g; g 2 Gg, jD f j is called the support of f and SISF is a user-defined Size-Increasing-Support-Function of each f; and . discriminative, s.t.,
where dr is a user-defined discriminative ratio.
The function SISF returns a support that increases with the input feature size. gIndex sets SISFð1Þ ¼ 1 by default. SISF gives the flexibility to allow indexing with infrequent features.
The individual features are represented by a canonical string called minimum DFS code [31] and gIndex is a prefix tree of the minimum DFS codes. gIndex processes queries in two phases. 1) Filtering: enumerate the maximum individual feature set F q from q, where F q ¼ ffjf q; f 2 F; 6 9f 0 ; s:t:; f f 0 ; f 0 qg, and filter out the graphs that do not contain a feature in F q to obtain the candidate set C q by performing the following intersections:
2) Verification: determine the query answers R q from the candidate set by invoking subIso, where R q ¼ fgjq g; g 2 C q g. It is worth noting that the intersections in the filtering phase are performed on graph IDs whereas subIso in the verification phase is invoked with graph data. Therefore, all previous indexes (see [3] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] ) propose innovative ideas to filter more non-answer graphs that aim to minimize the candidate set C q .
Example 3.1. We illustrate the filtering-and-verification framework with an example in Fig. 2 . The upper half of Fig. 2 shows the gIndex constructed from a set of individual features mined from G in Fig. 1 , F ¼ ff 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f 8 g, where SISFð1Þ ¼ 1, SISFð2Þ ¼ 2, maxL and dr are set to 2 and 0.1, respectively. f r is an artificial root node. The lower half of Fig. 2 shows its query processing: Given a query graph q, the filtering phase first enumerates all the maximum individual features F q ¼ ff 3 ; f 7 g of q and performs intersections of the graphs (via IDs) containing the individual feature(s) (D f 3 and D f 7 ) to compute the candidate set
The verification phase invokes subIso on each graph in C q , and computes the answers R q ¼ fg 4 g.
Background for Query Authentication
Cryptographic Primitives
Similar to other works on authentication, we assume a one-way collision-resistant hash function (e.g., SHA and MD5) is denoted as hðxÞ, where x is a data value to be hashed and the hash value hðxÞ is often referred to as the digest of x. It is infeasible to determine the preimage of a digest. We assume a public-key digital signature scheme, such as RSA, that guarantees the authenticity of a message or value. The signer has a private key ðSKÞ and can produce a signed message y ¼ signðx; SKÞ. Any public user has a public key ðPKÞ and can verify the message by decryption.
Merkle Hash Tree
The Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [21] is a classical authentication technique. The main idea of MHT is illustrated with an example shown in Fig. 3a . It is a classical MHT built on data values fx 1 ; . . . ; x 4 g. Each leaf node is associated with the digest (hash) of its data value, e.g., H x 1 ¼ hðx 1 Þ. Each internal node contains the digest of the concatenation of the digest of its child nodes, e.g., H x 1 ;x 2 ¼ hðH x 1 jH x 2 Þ. A data owner signs the digest of the root node.
To authenticate a data value, e.g., x 2 , the service provider sends to the client x 2 and a VO that consists of the digests H x1 and H x3;x4 and the signed root digest of H r . The client computes from the VO, H x2 ¼ hðx 2 Þ, H x1;x2 ¼ hðH x1 jH x2 Þ, and finally the root digest H x1;x4 ¼ hðH x1;x2 jH x3;x4 Þ. The client uses the data owner's public key to compare H x1;x4 and the signed root digest. If they agree, x 2 has not been tampered with. MHT can be extended to authenticate a set of data values.
MHT has been generalized to a multi-way index (such as Merkle B-tree [17] ) for database applications. Moreover, it has been embedded into index nodes (see the Embedded Merkle B-tree (EMB-tree) [17] ) to minimize VO sizes. Fig. 3b shows a search tree embedded with an MHT. The data in the MHT are fx 1 ; . . . ; x 4 g, the search keys are {1, 2, 3, 4}.
. Each leaf node is associated with the search key and the digest (hash) of its data value, e.g., ð1; H x1 Þ where 1 is the search key of x 1 ; and . Each internal node contains the search key and the digest of the concatenation of the digest of its child nodes, e.g., ð2; H 1;2 Þ where
Suppose that the search of the key 2 needs to authenticate. The VO contains (1, H x 1 ) and (4, H 3;4 ) and the data owner's signature on the root digest H r . The client computes H x 2 ¼ hðx 2 Þ, H 1;2 ¼ hðhðhð1ÞjH x 1 Þjhðhð2ÞjH x 2 ÞÞ, H 1;4 ¼ hðh ðhð2ÞjH 1;2 Þjhðhð4Þj H 3;4 ÞÞ, and finally the root digest H r ¼ hðhð4ÞjH 1;4 Þ. Similarly, by comparing the synthesized root digest and the data owner's signature, the client verifies the authenticity of the data from the service provider. From the boundaries (i.e., 1 and 4) of the search, the client verifies that the search is correct.
In this paper, we apply both kinds of MHTs (Figs. 3a and 3b) to various structures of our index to minimize VO.
Problem Formulation
System Model
The system model follows the existing authentication framework, that comprises three partiesV1) data owner DO, 2) service provider SP and 3) querying client.
1) The DO owns a graph database G. The DO or SP first generates an index to support subgraph query processing. Then, DO signs the root digest of the index.
2) The SP receives a query q from a client, processes it on behalf of DO and returns the answer graphs R q to the client. Since SP may not be trusted, it is required to return not only R q but also a VO and the DO's signature to the client. 3) Upon receiving the VO, the client verifies the R q the SP returns. We assume the client has the public key of the DO for authentication. In particular, the client verifies the following:
. Soundness: all graphs in R q are answers and they are not tampered with, i.e., 8g 2 R q , g 2 G^q g; and . Completeness: there is no graph that is not in R q but is an answer, i.e., 6 9 g 6 2 R q ; g 2 G^q g.
Threat Model
In our system model, the SP may not always be trusted. It may be a potential adversary or have been tampered with by attackers. In either case, we assume that the SP may alter the graph data or the index structure, introduce wrong answers, skip certain answers or abort the computation. An authentication framework is considered secure if attacking it under this threat model is as hard as inverting a one-way collision-resistant hash function. Given the above preliminaries, we are ready to formally present the problem statement.
Problem Statement
Given the above system and threat models, we seek an efficient authentication framework where the client may submit a subgraph query and verify the soundness and completeness of the answers returned by the service provider.
Baseline AuthenticationVMgIndex
In this subsection, we derive a baseline technique from gIndex. We sketch the main ideas of this naBve authentication approach and discuss the drawbacks of such an approach. For a concise exposition, we present the details in set semantics, unless otherwise specified. For detailed algorithm, please refer to Appendix B.
With reference to Formula (1) in Section 3.1, in order to authenticate the answer of the query q, the client must authenticate the correctness of 1) the query features F q and 2) their graph IDs D f (for all f 2 F q ) in order to verify the authenticity of the candidate set C q . Therefore, the client can examine C q to obtain the answer R q .
The baseline approach called MgIndex simply applies MHT to 1) the children of each index node of gIndex; and 2) the graphs (with IDs) of D f of each feature f, respectively. The query processing of MgIndex is similar to that of gIndex but incorporates with VO construction. More specifically, the VO of MgIndex consists of three main parts
1. VO index contains the digests that record the search of each individual feature f 2 F q during query processing and all the graph IDs (and the graphs' hash values if the graphs are not present in R q ) of D f for all f 2 F q ; 2. VO C q contains the non-answer graphs in the candidate set, i.e., VO Cq ¼ C q À R q , denoted as C R; and 3.
F is simply the signature of the data owner.
Example 3.2. We use Example 3.1 to illustrate the VO.
1. VO index contains the digests that record the search of F q ¼ ff 3 ; f 7 g. Suppose the search locates f 7 first. The VO index includes the digests of the nodes f 1 , f 3 , f 4 , and f 5 . The digest of node f 2 is computed by the client. When the search locates f 3 , the digest of f 3 in VO index is replaced by the actual content of the node f 3 . Thus, the client can verify f 3 . The graph IDs for each graph in D f7 and D f3 (i.e., {1, 2, 4} and {1, 4} respectively), and the hash value of g 2 are added to VO index ; and 2. VO Cq contains the non-answer graphs in the candidate set, i.e.,
Regarding the authentication at the client side, firstly, the client rebuilds the root digest of MgIndex using VO index and VO C q to verify that F q and C q are not tampered with. Secondly, it enumerates the query again to verify that F q is exactly f 3 and f 7 by using VO index . Thirdly, the client performs intersections on {1, 4} and {1, 2, 4} to verify the correctness of C q . Finally, the client performs the subIso tests to verify g 4 is the answer but not g 1 .
The sketch of the baseline approach reveals the performance bottlenecks of subgraph query authentication. The more features (i.e., more intersections) are used to determine C q (Formula (1)), the more VO index is needed to authenticate F q and the more graph IDs of D f are introduced. This not only leads to large VO, but also requires high time costs to authenticate them. Similar to query processing, query authentication also requires to minimize C q as the non-answer graphs (not the IDs) are included in VO C q .
Overview of Our Approach
In response to the drawbacks of the baseline approach, we propose more efficient authentication techniques. The frequently used symbols of our discussions are listed in Appendix E.
To minimize VO index while keeping C q small, we propose essentially to precompute some intersections offline, such that fewer intersections are involved at query time and hence need to be authenticated by clients. In particular, we propose higher-order features (Partially Overlapping Features POFs). In a nutshell, a POF consists of a set of overlapping individual features. If a data graph contains a POF, this implies it also contains those individual features in the POF. Hence, POFs are more selective than individual feature, and result in smaller candidate sets.
We propose the Intersection-aware Feature-subgraph Tree ðIFTreeÞ to index a graph database by POFs P . MerkleIFTree ðMIFTreeÞ is proposed by adopting MHTs on IFTree for basic authentication.
The overview of our solution is depicted in Fig. 4 . ! The client issues the query graph q to the SP. The SP first enumerates all the POFs P q of q. We then study how to decompose q into an optimal set P opt q which has the fewest number of intersections and smallest C q . " P opt q is then searched on MIFTree to obtain all the graph IDs of D p , denoted as IDðD p Þ, where p 2 P opt q and D p is a set of graphs that contain p. The candidate set C q is determined by intersecting IDðD p Þ as shown in Formula (1). # We derive a basic method to derive VO index from MIFTree which is similar to MgIndex. $ In addition, as the query graph size increases, so does the number of intersections. It is inefficient to include all IDðD p Þs, p 2 P opt q in a VO. Hence, to minimize the VO needed to authenticate intersections, we propose an enhanced method that uses a compact representation M p for each D p of p. We only include the single smallest M p , namely M pmin to VO. M pmin itself must be authenticated by the client but the answer graphs indicated by M p min may not fall into a range. We therefore analyze M p offline to cluster the ''intersect-able'' graphs in each D p , p 2 P , for an optimal ordering of the graphs stored in D p . % For VO C q , we include the non-answer candidate C Rand the mappings I M between the query and its answers. & DO's signature is added to VO. The client finally receives the VO to authenticate the answer.
PARTIALLY OVERLAPPING FEATURES
In this section, we derive the partially overlapping features (POFs) that aim to minimize the number of intersections involved in query time. The benefits are threefold. Fewer intersections are computed in query time; fewer graph IDs are fetched; and more individual features are implicitly involved and often lead to small candidate sets.
Types of Overlapping Features
Features can be composed in various ways. We derive POFs and call them higher-order features as they themselves are features and composed by individual features.
To describe POFs, we first present a few notations needed: Individual features F can be features proposed by any existing works. We adopt discriminative frequent feature [32] as the individual feature in this paper. We use g and F g to denote a graph and its individual features. We call the subgraph of g that is isomorphic to f as an instance of f, i.e., g 2 D f . With these notations, we derive POFs. We start with the feature of multiple individual features. Definition 4.1. A feature ff 1 ; . . . ;f n g is a co-existing feature of g if g contains an instance of f i for all i 2 f1; Á Á Á ; ng, where
The definition above can be trivially extended to a database G. Let ff 1 ; Á Á Á ; f n g be a co-existing feature of G, a graph
The next feature, namely overlapping feature, concerns not only the existence of features but also the overlapping of features. Definition 4.2. ff 1 ; Á Á Á ; f n g is an overlapping feature of g if it is a co-existing feature of g and there is a set S : fs 1 ; . . . ; s n g in g, where s i 2 S is an instance of f i , and S forms a connected graph.
We remark that singleton sets ff 1 g (i.e., n ¼ 1) are considered as ''overlapping'' features since each of their instance definitely forms a connected graph.
Example 4.1. Fig. 5 illustrates Defs. 4.1 and 4.2. In Fig. 5a , ff 4 ; f 7 g is a co-existing feature of g 1 . In Fig. 5b , ff 2 ; f 7 g is an overlapping feature of g 1 , as the instances of f 2 and f 7 not only exist but also overlap. One may be tempted to derive more sophisticated features, e.g., by exploiting the topology graph of an overlapping feature. However, such features may introduce a high complexity in query processing. In this paper, we adopt overlapping features. Moreover, consider overlapping features e.g., in Fig. 5b . The instances of f 2 and f 7 are completely overlapped. In practice, D f7 is often a subset of D f2 . Indexing graphs with both f 2 and f 7 are often redundant. Hence, we propose partially overlapping features defined in Def. 4.3. An example is shown in Fig. 5c . Definition 4.3. p : ff 1 ; . . . ; f n g is a partially overlapping feature ðPOFÞ of g, if 1) it is an overlapping feature of g and 2) there does not exist f i , f j 2 p, s.t., for each instance s i of f i and s j of f j , s i is completely overlapping with (i.e., contained in) s j .
Singleton sets are considered POFs since 1) they are special cases of overlapping features and 2) no two features whose instances are completely overlapping. This subtle case has a practical implication: Clients may issue queries with exactly one feature and it may be indexed.
To specify the desired POFs for indexing, we define a userspecified constraint. In particular, POFs should be small in size and have certain minimum support from a database. minSupÞ, where maxSize and minSup are the maximum size and the minimum support of P in a database G, i.e., 8p 2 P; jpj maxSize and jD p j ! minSup.
The number of all POFs of a database G is exponential to the number of features in worst case. In practice, many POFs do not have sufficient support. We adopt an enumeration algorithm to compute all POFs that satisfy the user-defined ðmaxSize; minSupÞ.
It is worth mentioning that the graphs indexed by a POF p : ff 1 ; . . . ; f n g (denoted as D p ) are a proper subset of the graphs in D f1 \ Á Á Á \ D fn . Indexing with p may be viewed as precomputing the intersections. In the rest of the paper, we use the term features P to refer to POF s, whereas f 1 ; . . . ; f n are referred to individual features.
INTERSECTION-AWARE FEATURE-SUBGRAPH TREE (IFTREE)
In this section, we present IFTree that indexes a graph database G with all POFs that satisfy maxSize and minSup.
We present the querying processing of IFTree, which is authenticated in Section 6.
IFTree
IFTree is a prefix tree on POFs where each node represents a POF and points to a list of graph IDs. Recall from Def. . str is a function that strðpÞ returns the string of p;
. node takes a POF p and returns the node of p in T P ;
. ID is a function that IDðD p Þ returns the list of IDs of the graphs in D p ; and . p r is an empty POF ; and nodeðp r Þ is an artificial root node of the IFTree.
Example 5.1. Fig. 6 shows the IFTree of the POFs P of G of Fig. 1 . Due to space constraints, we skip the enumeration that yields P : fp 1 Á Á Á p 15 g. Each box of the tree represents a POF. The constraint of POF ðmaxSize; minSupÞ is (2, 2). Consider p 9 . The IFTree has an edge between p 1 and p 9 but not p 2 and p 9 as strðp 2 Þ ¼ ''2'', strðp 9 Þ ¼ ''1:2'' and therefore p 2 6 0 p 9 . To illustrate the processing of existing indexes and IFTree, let's assume that a query contains two individual features f 2 and f 7 . gIndex retrieves and intersects D f2 and D f7 whereas IFTree simply retrieves D p11 .
Query Processing on IFTree
The query processing on IFTree is detailed in Alg. 1. 2 It takes a query graph q, a graph database G, the prefix tree T F of features F and the IFTree T P of G as input. It determines all maximum individual features F q that fully cover q (Line 2). From F q , it computes all possible POFs P q from F q (Line 3) and determines the optimal POFs P opt q from P q (Line 4), which shall be discussed shortly. For each POF p in P opt q , the graphs of D p are retrieved by searching IFTree and maintained in a candidate set C q (Lines 5-6). For each graph in C q , the algorithm verifies if it is in fact an answer (Lines 7-8). 2. Some pseudocode in Alg. 1, e.g., Lines 1 and 2, are straightforward but verbose. Hence, for concise presentation, we present their main ideas in text.
Following up Example 3.1, we use Fig. 7 to illustrate the query processing on IFTree (shown in Fig. 6 ) in the following discussion.
Algorithm 1 Query Processing ðq; G; T F ; T P Þ Input: A query graph q, a graph database G, the prefix tree T F of features F and the IFTree T P of G Output: the answer set of q R q 1: Initialize R q to ; and C q to G 2: F q ¼ find maxfeaturesðq; T F Þ //F q fully cover q 3: P q ¼ find POFðq; F q ; T P Þ //Enumeration 4:
It is worth noting that Alg. 1 involves two optimizations. The first one is similar to an existing work [32] Vthe query q is decomposed into maximum individual features F q by using an enumeration method. f is maximum in terms of q if and only if there does not exist a larger f 0 such that subIsoðf; f 0 Þ ¼ true and subIsoðf 0 ; qÞ ¼ true. Unlike previous work, we determine F q that fully covers q. When compared to non-covers, a cover F q is expected to be more selective and yields a small candidate set in the filtering phase. F q is then used to enumerate POFs, as indicated in the RHS of Fig. 7 . For example, as in Example 3.1, gIndex computes F q as ff 3 ; f 7 g. However, Alg. 1 determines F q as ff 2 ; f 3 ; f 7 g (in Line 2). Without f 2 , F q does not fully cover q.
The second optimization is that an optimal decomposition P opt q is determined from F q . In the filtering-andverification framework (e.g., Fig. 7 ), graph data are fetched from disk mainly in two steps: 1) when graph IDs of D p 's are fetched from disk for performing intersections; and 2) when candidate graphs are fetched for subiso tests. This leads to two competing objectives in computing P The optimal decomposition addresses the above two objectives. 1) To minimize P pi2P opt q w i , fewer terms are included in the sum, which not only indicates fewer intersections in query processing, but also minimizes I/O due to graph IDs. 2) For each p i , the more 1 s in M q ði; ÃÞ, the more individual features it contains, the smaller w i and D pi . Therefore, using p i leads to a smaller candidate set.
Proposition 5.1. The problem of optimal decomposition of a query q from P q is NP-hard.
The hardness can be established from a simple reduction from minimum weighted set cover ðMWSCÞ. Due to the space constraint, the proof is presented in Appendix A. We adopt a classical heuristic algorithm for MWSC to solve the problem. The idea is simple: it iteratively chooses the POF with the smallest weight (covering the most number of uncovered features in F q ) and removes the covered features from F q . It terminates when F q is empty (fully covered). This heuristic can be exemplified by the example M q shown in Fig. 7 . Initially, w 2 ¼ w 3 ¼ w 7 ¼ 1 as the hamming weights of M q ð2; ÃÞM q ð3; ÃÞ and M q ð7; ÃÞ are 1. w 11 ¼ 1=2 as hammingðM q ð11; ÃÞÞ ¼ 2. In the first iteration, p 11 is chosen. Since f 2 and f 7 are covered by p 11 , they are removed from F q and the weights w 2 , w 3 and w 7 are updated accordingly. In the second iteration, p 3 is chosen. All features in F q are covered and the algorithm terminates. P opt q is fp 3 ; p 11 g. 
MERKLE IFTREE (MIFTREE)
Thanks to the minimization of I/O by using P opt q , the query processing trace needed to be included in VOs is reduced when IFTree is adopted for query authentication. To facilitate efficient authentication, we propose to apply MHTs to IFTree to obtain Merkle IFTree ðMIFTreeÞ. Recall that IFTree is a prefix tree for the string representations of POFs. The index nodes near the root of IFTree often have large fanouts, as those POFs may overlap with many other individual features to form larger POFs. Therefore, an MHT is embedded to the children of each index node to minimize VO. In addition, in practice, some POFs may index a large number of graphs. For instance, in the dataset AIDS, the number of graphs containing the POF of an index node near the root of the IFTree is 12 percent of the total number of graphs. When some of these graphs are selected into the candidate set in the filtering phase, a classical MHT is needed to efficiently authenticate these graphs. Hence, we propose the Merkle IFTree ðMIFTreeÞ as follows. The rest of this section describes the signing of MIFTree in detail and a basic authentication of MIFTree.
Signing MIFTree
Similar to the majority of search trees for query authentication, we associate hash values/digests to the nodes of IFTree. The data owner DO signs the root of the digest of MIFTree. Specifically, we formalize the digests and signatures of MIFTree below. Definition 6.2. The digest of a data graph g i is defined as
Graphs are cast into some (publicly known) canonical representation before their digests are computed. In this paper, we adopt the minimum DFS code [31] 3 , denoted as mindfs, but other representations may also be adopted. It should be remarked that the individual features F q must be authenticated in order to verify the correctness of POFs. We organize all features F of G with a prefix tree T F similar to MIFTree. The authentication process of F q is simpler than that of P opt q .
Basic Authentication Method
In this subsection, we present the constitution of VO and a basic authentication method. For a concise exposition, we present the details in set semantics, unless otherwise specified.
Verification Object
The overview of the constitution of VO can be given as follows. VO consists of the VO for recording the searches of P ). These are necessary to reconstruct the digest of the root of MIFTree. Moreover, the graphs (not only their IDs) in the candidate set are included in VO Cq for client's verification. While the query answers R q must be returned, the non-answers in the 3 . Due to space constraints, we have to omit the details of mindfs.
As an example, mindfsðg 3 Þ ¼ ðð1; 2; C; CÞ; ð2; 3; C; CÞ; ð2; 4; C; OÞÞ. The first two digits are the DFS sequence of the vertices of a graph. The following characters are vertices' labels. candidate set C q must also be included in VO Cq , denoted as C R, where C R¼ C q À R q , to verify that no graph in C Ris an answer. For verification efficiency, the mappings between the query and the answers are included in VO C q . To sum up, we define the constitution of VO, presented in Def. 6.6 which consists of the structures and auxiliary structures discussed above. As discussed in Def. 6.1, we have applied MHTs in MIFTree for small VO. The description of VO of an MHT is well-known but verbose, which includes the answers, the boundaries and the search keys of search paths. For succinct presentation, we define a term ''VO of MHT'' to leverage on the known results from MHT. For example, recall from Section 3 that Fig. 3b shows an embedded MHT where fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 g are data values and {1, 2, 3, 4} are the search keys. The search of the key is 2 and the answer is x 2 . The VO of the MHT are (1, H x1 ) and (4, H 3;4 ), with which H r can be synthesized.
Algorithm 2 Auth Query Processing ðq; G; T F ; T P ; Þ
Input: A query graph q, a graph database G, the prefix tree T F of features F , the MIFTree T P of G and . Output: the answer set of q R q and verification object VO.
1: Initialize R q and the structures in VO to ; and C q to G 2: F q ¼ find maxfeaturesðq; T F Þ //F q fully cover q 3: P q ¼ find POFðq; F q ; T P Þ //Enumeration 4:
where m is the mapping from q to g. . I M : fm 1 ; . . . ; m n g is a set of subgraph isomorphism mappings from q to R q : fg 1 ; . . . ; g n g; and .
C Rare non-answer graphs in the candidate set C q .
VO Construction
The VO of a query is constructed by Alg. Fig. 9 We note that IDðD 3 Þ ¼ ½1; 4, IDðD 11 Þ ¼ ½2; 4 and g 4 2 C q . Then, ! L p3 ¼ ½ð1; H g1 Þ; 4 and L p11 ¼ ½ð2; H g2 Þ; 4. Since g 1 ; g 2 6 2 C q , only their IDs are needed. Due to space issues, the N b I shown is partial. The RHS of Fig. 9 shows " the (partial) MHTs of the children of nodeðp r Þ and nodeðp 2 Þ. The white boxes indicate the VO derived from MHTs and they are parts of b r and b 2 in N b I . The I M in VO C q is the subgraph isomorphism mapping from q to g 4 . Since
q is empty.
Authentication at Client
When the client receives R q and VO, he/she verifies the correctness of R q . Since the process is similar to Alg. 2 and existing authentication works, we only give an example and highlight the major steps and elaborate Step 4) below, which is unique in MIFTree:
1. compute F q and verify F q is the maximum individual fully cover features of q by using q, N F and F ; 4 2. compute P q and verify P q is consistent to those in N I by using q, F q and N I ; 3. determine P opt q by using F q and P q ; 4. synthesize H pr by using P opt q and the VO; 5. verify the H p r with the signature I and the public key; 6. determine C q by intersecting the L p s from N v I , where p 2 P opt q ; and 7. verify R q by using I M ; and if I M is not correct, invokes subIso; and verify C Rby invoking subIso.
In
Step 4), the root digest H pr is synthesized bottom-up: We start the synthesis from the p in P q that do not have a p 0 2 P q s.t. p 0 p 0 . At each synthesis step, p i can only be in one of the two cases: Case 1 p i is in P q but not in P (Def. 6.3), the client can recompute H pi . Then, p i is removed from P q . In the recursive step, the synthesis proceeds to another p in P q with no p 0 2 P q^p 0 p 0 . With the H p for all p 2 P q , H p r is synthesized. We present the formal proofs of the soundness and completeness of the basic authentication in Appendix A. Example 6.3. To illustrate Step 4), we present the major steps of the synthesis of H p r of Fig. 9 . To compute H p r bottom-up, we may start the synthesis from p 11 since p 11 2 P opt q and 6 9p 0 2 P q s.t. p 11 0 p 0 . We may start at p 3 for a similar reason. Let's start at p 11 . n 11 ¼ ðp 11 ; L p 11 Þ. H D p 11 can be computed from L p 11 and R q . The root digest H r p11 of the MHT of nodeðp 11 Þ's children can be computed since the MHT is empty. H p11 can then be determined from p 11 , H Dp 11 and H r p 11 . p 11 is removed from P q . After that, we m a y p r o c e e d t o p 2 , since p 2 2 P q^p2 6 2 P opt q . n 2 ¼ ðp 2 ; H Dp 2 Þ. We determine H r p 2 from the computed ðp 11 ; H p 11 Þ and the VO of MHT of nodeðp 2 Þ's children such as b 2 . In this case, H p 2 is obtained and p 2 is removed from the P q . We then proceed to p 3 . H p 3 is obtained, similar to the synthesis of H p 11 . H p 7 is synthesized similar to H p 2 . With the same logic, n r ¼ ðp r ; H D pr Þ. With H p 2 , H p 3 , H p 7 and the VO of MHT of nodeðp r Þ's children, H p r is synthesized.
ENHANCED AUTHENTICATION
While the basic method presented in Section 6 is natural to authenticate the filtering-and-verification framework of subgraph query, VO sometimes contains excessive graph IDs. In this section, we propose two enhancements on the basic method.
Firstly, all graph IDs of each feature p 2 P opt q are returned and in Step 6) of authentication, intersected at the client side to ensure the correctness of C q . To optimize this, we propose a compact representation of graph IDs. Secondly, graph IDs are needed to synthesize the digests of MIFTrees nodes, as elaborated in Step 4) of authentication. As motivated in Section 1, graph IDs of C q do not fall into a range in general which may lead to large VOs when 4. As F is organized in a prefix tree T F , F q can be verified by using q, N F and signature F in a similar way.
classical authentication techniques are adopted. Hence, we propose to cluster graphs with similar feature sets offline. As a result, when a query is retrieved by using a set of features, the IDs of C q may be clustered and represented by a smaller VO.
Compact Representation of Graph IDs
The main idea to reduce the excessive graph IDs for verifying the intersections is to encode all the features of each graph in a D p in a binary matrix M p . The data owner signs the matrix. Hence, the client requires one IDðD p Þ and M p to verify the intersections. Next, we build a classical MHT to each M p (defined with H M p in Def. 7.2). The authentication process can then be described as follows. Consider 3 . We remark that the ID of g 1 is not needed in L p 3 , since s 11 ½1 ¼ 0 and s 11 will be authenticated in B p 3 . Thus, g 1 is certainly not in C q .
Clustering Intersect-Able Graphs
The matrix M p (defined in Def. 7.1) not only minimizes the number of graph IDs by using M pmin , but also indicates how much VO is needed for authenticating the candidate set. In particular, let intvðM p ; iÞ denote the number of intervals in the row of p i , where all entries in each interval are 1 s. The 1 s in M p ði; Ã) correspond to the graphs in D p \ D p i and intvðM p ; iÞ is the number of ranges needed to be authenticated. To authenticate a range, the upper and lower bounds of the range are needed in VO. This argument can be generalized to the intersections of multiple sets.
In this subsection, we define the problem of optimal permutation (of columns) of M p . The ordering of graphs in IDðD p Þ is optimal when intersecting the graphs of other POFs, the number of the intervals is minimized. We remark that the ordering is optimal in the absence of queries. 
Ì
The OPM problem can be solved by heuristics of SHP. We cast an instance of OPM into that of SHP. Specifically, given an instance of OPM M p , we generate a complete graph in terms of M p . Each column (graph ID in IDðD p Þ) of M p is a vertex and the weight of the edge between two vertices is the total number of different 1 s between the two respective columns. The difference of the row of p i states that one graph has p i but the other does not. That is, one graph appears in D p \ D pi and the other does not. A final trick is to add an artificial node s 0 as the source and sink of the graph being constructed. We extend M p with a column of zeros for s 0 . The SHP of such a complete graph encodes a permutation of columns of M p . We have proved that the total sum of the weight of the optimal SHP is twice of the number of intervals in M p after the optimal permutation. One of the most efficient approximation algorithms for SHP LKH-2[18] is adopted. The algorithm is K-opt and the approximation ratio is preserved under the above conversion.
Example 7.2. To illustrate the effect of the permutation, we create a small artificial example. Suppose that P opt q is fp i ; p j g; IDðD p i Þ ¼ ½1; 3; 5; 7; 9 and IDðD p j Þ ¼ ½2; 3; 8; 9. Assume further p i and p j are the only POFs of the database. Then, C q ¼ fg 3 ; g 9 g. p min is p j as jD pj j ¼ 4 and jD pi j ¼ 5. Before permutation, the L pmin in VO is ½H ð2;g2Þ ; 3;H ð8;g8Þ ; 9. In contrast, after the permutation, IDðD pmin Þ ¼ ½2; 8; 3; 9. The L pmin contains ½H ð2;g2Þ;ð8;g8Þ ; 3; 9.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present a detailed experimental evaluation that verifies the performance of our proposed techniques and the effectiveness of our optimizations.
Experimental Setup
Running Platform
We conducted all our experiments on a machine with an Intel Core 2 Quad 2.4 GHz CPU and 4 GB memory running Windows 7 OS. All our techniques were implemented using C++. We implemented our algorithms on top of iGraph [8] . SHA and RSA were used as our cryptographic signing schemes.
Dataset
Following previous experiments of iGraph, we used the same real-world and synthetic datasets in our experimental evaluation. The real-world dataset consists of 10,000 graphs, all of which are drawn from a real AIDS Antiviral dataset (hereafter denoted as AIDS) [24] . AIDS has been used in many studies of subgraph queries [3] , [9] , [12] , [28] , [29] , [32] , [36] , [37] . On average, AIDS has 25.42 vertices and 27.40 edges. The number of distinct vertex labels and distinct edge labels are 51 and 4.
For the synthetic dataset, we used SYN.10K.E30.D3.L50 (denoted as SYN). It contains 10,000 graphs of which the average size (the number of edges) is 30; the average density is 0.3; and the number of distinct vertex/edge labels is 50.
We used gSpan [31] with the default settings [32] on the above two datasets to obtain a set of discriminative frequent features, which are served as individual features for our experiment.
Query Sets
For both AIDS and SYN, the query sets (denoted as Qn) used have been benchmarked in previous works [3] , [9] , [12] , [28] , [32] , [36] . Each Qn contains 1000 graphs with size (the number of edges) of n, e.g., Q4 represents 1000 graphs sized 4.
I/O Cost and Query Time Comparison
We used two representative indexes, namely gIndex [32] and FGIndex [3] , to compare the I/O cost (number of graph IDs and graph data fetched) and query time of IFTree. We used the same settings for gIndex and FGIndex as in previous experiment [8] . We note that gIndex often outperformed FGIndex except for small queries and hence we concentrated on comparisons using gIndex.
Baseline Comparison
Since there is no existing work on subgraph query authentication, we implemented the authentication on gIndex [32] asa baseline,denoted as MgIndex (seeSection 3.4).ForMgIndex, we also used the same settings as gIndex. Since it is known that binary MHTs yield smaller VO, in our implementation, the MHTs used are binary MHTs.
Offline Computation and Memory Overhead
The offline computation mainly involves 1) the selection of individual features, which takes around 0.5 min and 1 min for AIDS and SYN, respectively; 2) the selection of POFs, which takes around 30 min and 1 min for each of the dataset; and 3) the clustering of the intersect-able graphs, which takes around 24 h for each of the dataset. For both basic authentication and enhanced authentication, the memory consumptions at the server side and the client side are always smaller than 300 MB and 8 MB, respectively.
Experiments on AIDS
Effects of maxSize and minSup of POF Fig. 11a reports the effects of the maximal size ðmaxSizeÞ and the minimum support ðminSupÞ of POFs by varying maxSize and minSup for Q8 queries. The x-axis is ðmaxSize; minSupÞ, e.g., (4, 0.5) represents maxSize ¼ 4 and maxSup ¼ 500. The trends were that when minSup increased or maxSize decreased, the number of POFs of the IFTree (i.e., the index nodes needed by IFTree) decreased and the candidate size increased (which is directly related to VO size). We set the default values of maxSize and minSup to 4 and 500 to strike a balance between pruning and IFTree size.
I/O Cost and Query Performance
Average Number of Graph IDs Fig. 11b shows the average number of graph IDs fetched at query time by varying the query sizes. Since the numbers for FGIndex were over 70 K, we could not show them here. In Fig. 11b , we can see that IFTree had significantly fewer graph IDs than gIndex, especially when the query size was large. The reason was because the size of P opt q was small as each p 2 P opt q was chosen by our heuristic discussed in Section 5.2. Moreover, the size of each D p ðp 2 P opt q Þ was small.
Average Number of Non-Answer Graphs ðC RÞ in the Candidate Set Fig. 11c shows that the average size of C Rby varying the query sizes. IFTree produced smaller C Rwhen compared to gIndex and FGIndex in most cases. For example, at Q4, the C Rof IFTree contained 27.2 percent fewer graphs than that of gIndex. At Q24, IFTree resulted in 13.2 percent fewer graphs. As FGIndex was verification-free, 5 Q4 queries were small graphs. Most of them were features already and in such cases, there was no non-answer graph in the candidate set. However, when queries were larger than 4, FGIndex produced larger C R.
Average Query Time Fig. 11d reports the average query time at the service provider. At Q4, the average query times on gIndex and IFTree were large since the size of C Rwas large for small queries. The subIso test on those graphs dominated the query time. FGIndex was verification-free and Q4 queries in most cases did not require to verify. When the query size increased after Q12, the query time on IFTree became slightly larger. The reason was that the size of P q became large and finding the optimal decomposition from P q incurred relatively large overhead, while their C Rs of gIndex and IFTree were being similar. However, the benefits of using P opt p become clear in the experiments on authentication.
Performance of Basic Authentication Query Composition
Prior to a detailed performance analysis, we show the composition of queries of AIDS, presented in Fig. 12a . TQ1 5. Given a query graph q, if q is a feature, i.e., q ¼ f, it implies that there is no need to verify the subIso between q and g 2 C q as
are queries that contain exactly one POF in their P opt q , In this case, MIFTree does not perform intersections at query time. TQ2 are queries decomposed into multiple POFs and all proposed algorithms in MIFTree affect the performances. From Fig. 12a , we note that TQ2 dominated the query sets as the query size increased. Fig. 12b shows us the average number of intersections needed versus the query size. MIFTree required significantly fewer intersections at query time compared to MgIndex. For instance, at Q4 and Q24, MIFTree required 45.2 percent and 50.8 percent fewer intersections, respectively, than MgIndex.
Average Number of Intersections
Total VO Size
The small number of intersections performed by MIFTree is reflected in the size of VO. Fig. 12c shows the VO sizes of MIFTree and MgIndex with varying query sizes. Looking at MgIndex, when the query size increased, the size of the feature set jF q j rapidly became larger and the number of intersections performed at query time also increased accordingly. For each addition of feature, f, all the graph IDs of D f were added to VO (see Fig. 11b ). Therefore, VO enlarged rapidly with query size. For MIFTree, VO increased with the query size, although at a slower rate. However, since jP opt q j was often clearly smaller than jF q j (see Fig. 12b ) and for each p in P opt q , jD p j was relatively small (see Fig. 11b ), MIFTree clearly outperformed MgIndex. Moreover, the VO of MIFTree did not increase as rapidly as that of MgIndex. We highlight that the VO size at Q4 was large since the size of non-answers in the candidate set ðC RÞ was clearly larger than others, which required some VO to authenticate them.
Average Authentication Time   Fig. 12d reports the average authentication time at client side. We observed that the authentication time of MIFTree was often 4 times faster than that of MgIndex. The number of intersections, i.e., jP opt q j was smaller. Thus, fewer MHTs of IDðD p Þ were reconstructed, which is a performance bottleneck during authentication. Further, the sizes of D p s of P opt q were smaller (refer to Fig. 11b ). These factors made MIFTree clearly more efficient than MgIndex.
Performance of Enhanced Authentication
While the basic authentication already outperformed MgIndex, in this part, we verify the enhanced method further optimizes authentication performances.
Performance on Clustered Graphs
We study the VO size due to the MHT of IDðD p min Þ in Figs. 13a and 13b. The queries used were TQ2. Fig. 13a first shows the average number of the intervals on M p min for each queries. Recall Section 7.2, the fewer intervals on M p min , the smaller VO size due to the MHT of IDðD p min Þ. Therefore, Fig. 13b reports such VO size, whose trends were similar to Fig. 13a . We note that the average size of VO at Q4 and Q8 increased. The reason was that most of the query features were frequent, then C q in D pmin was relatively large. Therefore, the VO became larger. At Q12-Q24, their features contained more infrequent features. Then C q was relatively small. Hence, the VO for computing H D p decreased with the query size. However, in all queries, the graph permutations of the graph IDs of D p min clearly led to smaller VO size.
Total VO Size   Fig. 13c shows the comparison of VO sizes between basic method and enhanced method for TQ2. For TQ1, the VO of enhanced method was almost the same to that of basic method as there was no intersection for TQ1. The figure shows that the enhanced method reduced VO sizes significantly. For basic method, VO contained all the graph IDs in IDðD p Þ ðp 2 P opt q Þ that were needed to be authenticated (see Fig. 11b ). Instead, VO for enhanced method contained the VO of MHT of IDðD pmin Þ to authenticate. For instance, at Q24, VO by enhanced method was about 20 KB whereas that of the basic method was around 120 KB.
Average Authentication Time   Fig. 13d shows the comparison of authentication time of the basic and enhanced methods. At Q4, since the candidate set contained a large number of non-answer graphs (shown in Fig. 11c ), the subiso test dominated the authentication time. When the query size went beyond Q4, more queries required the basic method to re-build the root digest of the MHT of each IDðD p Þ, p 2 P opt q and the graph IDs were intersected to determine the candidate set. Thus, the authentication time increased rapidly as the query size increased. In comparison, while the authentication time for the enhanced method increased with the query size, it increased in a much slower rate. The reason was that only M pmin and IDðD pmin Þ were needed to authenticate.
Overall Response Time
The overall response time consists of the time for query processing, data transmission and authentication. Although the query times of different methods (Fig. 11d) were close, the improvements of our methods of VO size (Figs. 12c and 13c ) and authentication times (Figs. 12d and  13d) were often an order of magnitude more than those of the baseline, which led to better response times.
Experiments on Synthetic Dataset
Finally, we tested our techniques on SYN. We varied ðmaxSize; minSupÞ and observed the same trends as those from AIDS. We chose (5, 300) as default. Since the results are similar to those from AIDS, we present some major results in this subsection.
Average Query Time and Authentication Time
Figs. 14a and 14b show the query time and authentication time, respectively. In Fig. 14a , we note that the query time of MIFTree was slightly longer than that of the MgIndex. Importantly, Fig. 14b shows that the authentication time of MIFTree of basic and enhanced method were at least 3 and 4 times faster than the MgIndex, respectively. The speedup of the enhanced method was up to 8 times. These results were due to smaller VOs. Fig. 14c shows the clustering of graphs of TQ2 queries reduced at least 50 percent of the VO size due to the MHT of IDðD p min Þ. The reasons for the trends were the same to the AIDS. The permutations on IDðD pmin Þ of SYN performed even better than that of AIDS.
Performance on Clustered Graphs
Total VO Size
We compared VO size for TQ2 queries between basic method and enhanced method, shown in Fig. 14d . The figure shows that the enhanced method consistently generated smaller VOs when the query sizes were larger than 4. 
CONCLUSION
We investigated the authentication of subgraph query services of outsourced graph databases. We proposed an index IFTree that minimizes the I/O cost of the popular filtering-and-verification framework for subgraph query processing. We then proposed MIFTree by extending IFTree to authenticate subgraph query. To optimize the VO derived from MIFTree, we proposed a compact VO representation and a clustering of graphs having similar subset of features. We conducted a detailed experiment to evaluate the performance of our proposed techniques and the effectiveness of the enhancements. For future work, we are investigating the authentication of subgraph similarity query.
